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FORT SUMNER: A STUDY IN ORIGINS

FRANK MC NITr

THE

and nearly treeless plains that enclose the greater course
of the Pecos River always have challenged the endurance of explorers and discouraged all but a few determined efforts at settlement. If Antonio de Espejo was not induced to linger when he
followed the tortuous stream southward in 1583, the same may be
said for Castano de Sosa's men when they worked their way northward seven years later. These earliest explorers were not soon followed by others.
For more than two hundred fifty years the region between Anton Chico and a point near the Bosque Grande would be claimed
and almost exclusively roamed-but never inhabited for long-by
Kiowa and Comanche and by Mescalero Apache. Spanish and
then Mexican owners of sheep would winter-graze their animals
south from Anton Chico and La Cuesta and Chaparita, but perhaps not so frequently as some ranchers later would remember.
A professional interest on the part of American military officers
produced little to support the notion of a sheepcraising climate nurtured by the Pecos River, but did substantiate legends of war and
peace gatherings at Bosque Redondo by the two Plains tribes mentioned, these gatherings sometimes joined by Apache allies of the
Jicarilla and Mescalero bands. Not infrequently, Spanish or Mexican and Pueblo traders (the Comancheros of legend) would find
their way to these councils to barter guns and ammunition, as well
as cloth goods and firewater, in exchange for Indian horses. But
in a territory so wide professional military interest necessarily was
spread thin. It is not strange, then, that when they prepared their
ARID
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1846-1847 map of New Mexico, Lieutenants James W. Abert and
William G. Peck showed the Pecos vanishing, a.few miles below
Anton Chico, into the unknown, into blank white space. They
thought, and cannot be too seriously blamed for it, that the Pecos
was a tributary of the Rio Grande.
Every wondering conjectural approach to why a military post
was established at Bosque Redondo (but more especially why that
post was made the center of a reservation for Navajo and Apache)
must begin by studying a series of military surveys; inevitably it
will end by examining the actions of one man: James H. Carleton.
An uncertainty about what might be found on the plains and in
the valleys of the Pecos led Brevet Colonel John Munr<;>e, commanding the Ninth Military Department, to issue orders for the
first survey by American forces in 1850. Snow was deep on the
Sangre de Cristos when Captain Henry B. Judd, Third Artillery,
led a light company equipped as cavalry southward from Las
Vegas. His departure, on March 1 5, would assure his command
the discomfort of facing into high winds off the Sierra Capitan.
Richard H. Kern, who as artist, diarist and amiable companion had
proved so valuable during the previous summer's Navajo expedition, was Judd's cartographer. Five wagons trailed the column with
provisions for two weeks.
Judd's course, dictated by a rough broken country below Anton
Chico, turned him east on the Fort Smith road as far as Lagunitas
and then south along the east bank of the Pecos. The river for the
next few days remained always present to the right, but invisible
in the twisting depths of a red sandstone canyon. Aside from an
occasional mesquite bush the prairie country contained no timber
until the command reached the Arroyo de los Esteros. Here wood
enough for fires was found, and water, too, though brackish to the
taste. Only twice thereafter, in the valley bottoms of Bosque Redondo and Bosque Grande, were trees seen again. The character
of the land generally was a sandy prairie with covering of grama
grass interspersed with cane cactus and the yucca plant. At a point
nearly below Bosque Grande Captain Judd had intended to turn
west, exploring and mapping a route through the Sierra de Jumanos
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to the Rio Grande. He was diverted from this purpose, however,
upon learning that the distance separating the two rivers was much
greater than hitherto believed. This, and the weakened condition of
his horses, persuaded him to back-trail to Las Vegas. After arriving
there March 29 he reported to the department commander that he
found the soil of both timbered bosques to be rich and fertile; deer
and turkey and duck were numerous, and the stream abounded in
fish. 1 Judd believed that either of the bosques offered an important
position for a post garrisoned by mounted troops.
Colonel Munroe took no action in the matter. The question of a
military post on the Pecos remained in abeyance until the arrival
in New Mexico of Munroe's successor, Brevet Colonel Edwin Vose
Sumner, in July I 85 I. Determined that Santa Fe was an evil place
and to be avoided, Sumner on his march from Fort Leavenworth
turned off the main road to the capital somewhere between T ecolote and San Miguel and marched down the Pecos some little
distance in search of an eligible site for his headquarters. Nothing
has been found to tell how far down the stream he explored, but the
evidence suggests he went no farther than Anton Chico. 2 What he
saw apparently did not please him. Within a few weeks he would
establish headquarters on Coyote Creek, naming his log buildings
Fort Union.
In terms of the ultimate decision, the survey of the Pecos that
had greatest importance was that of Brevet Major James H. Carleton in February I 852. A native of Maine, Carleton was left fatherless when he was fifteen years old, and educated in Boston. His
Raring talent (and brassy ego) caused him at the age of twenty-six
to write Charles Dickens asking not alone for literary counsel but
for friendship should he venture to England. He responded to the
novelist's firm but not unkind rebuff by pursuing, instead, a military career. He reported in 1839 as a second lieutenant to then
Captain Sumner, at Carlisle Barracks. More or less ever since the
two had been together in the First Regiment of Dragoons, a certain brilliance and brash arrogance in the younger man striking
strange chords of affectionate approval in Sumner's massively
wooden nature.
·
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Sumner's orders to Carleton have not been found, but the tenor
of the major's subsequent report indicates that he was instructed
to investigate any movement of Indians in the vicinity of Bosque
Redondo, and determine whether the Pecos offered a desirable site
for a military post. 3 Major Carleton left Fort Union February 3 at
the head of Company K, First Dragoons, his train including two
wagons to which he added loads of unshelled corn obtained at Anton Chico. Because he feared that winter prairie grass would not
sustain his horses, he sent forward additional supplies of corn to
be held under guard, or cached, at a crossing of the Gallinas River
and at the mouth of the Esteros.
Turning south from the Fort Smith road February Io, Company
K followed Judd's descending trail to Tanos Creek, the dry arroyos
of San Juan de Dios and Alamo Gordo (the last of which Carleton
explored to its head), and to Las Carretas Canon, finally reaching
Bosque Redondo February 13. Leaving his command at the lower
end of the bosque, Carleton set out on foot to look for Indian "sign,"
continuing down river five miles more. From a sandy eminence
near Alamos Muchos, a sweeping view of barren prairie gave "not
the least evidence that a single human being of any discription had
been in the vicinity for many months." Carleton ordered a noncommissioned officer to fire the tall grass of the river bottom, thinking if Comanche or Apache were about this would bring them
near. Smoke rolled upward in an immense column and as darkness
came on the sky turned ruddy, but itavailed nothing as rio Indians
appeared.
Camp was moved next day northward into the bosque and again
the bottom land was fired, but again without result. One gathers
that Carleton's state of mind, from this point forward, was euphoric. Very nearly everything he found here (if not quite all)
convinced him that Bosque Redondo was "a most excellent point
for the establishment of a strong cavalry post." He enumerated its
advantages: round groves of cottonwoods shading the sinuous
course of the stream in a valley perhaps twenty miles long and from
one and a half to two miles wide; a soil dark chocolate in color, exceedingly rich and fertile and free of stones, that would not suffer in

La ~aleria de los flrtesanos
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comparison with the black loamy Missouri bottom; the Pecos a
constantly Rowing stream abounding in beaver; sunRowers so tall
their stalks reached higher than a man's head even when the man
sat astride a horse; grama grass higher than a horseman's saddle
skirts, the thick rank grass sheltering immense coveys of wild turkeys (very fat and finely Ravored), not to mention Rocks of antelope and deer and occasional wild horses; a supply of cottonwood
"for building and other purposes" nearly limitless.
Threading Carleton's rhapsody, but almost submerged, was a
comment that the valley bottom might be subject to overRow; also,
that the surrounding country was sandy and sterile, that pools and
springs found in abundance near the Pecos were more or less brackish, and that a saline efHorescence whitened the beds of tributary
channels.
But apart from such few and small detractions the Bosque Redondo was a natural paradise of quite practical values: It was strategically placed in the center between hostile tribes of Indians, and
a supply route from Fort Smith was shorter than and superior to.
the road from Fort Leavenworth. Finally, the moment a military
post was established here, "a large number of settlers would immediately Rock in-the produce of whose farms brought in competition one with the other, would be sold very low indeed."
Colonel Sumner may have been favorably impressed, but two
years went by without further action. Then, in early fall of I 854,
another survey of the Pecos was ordered by a new department commander, Brevet Brigadier General John Garland. Again Major
Carleton was chosen, but now with the stated purpose of selecting
a site for a military post between Anton Chico and a point about
twenty miles south of Bosque Redondo. The route followed (used
ten years over some of its distance later by Navajo bound for confinement) was in part new. Carleton with his own Company K left
Albuquerque October 5. He was accompanied by Brevet Second
Lieutenant Henry B. Davidson whose task for the next three weeks
would be to map, measure distances, and in a daily journal record
the nature of the country explored. This-and more-with metic~
ulous zeal the young Tennessean accomplished; the journal is
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Davidson's, but appears to have employed the eyes and the mind
of Carleton. 4
From Albuquerque the column marched due east to Tijeras,
here turning south in the Manzanos to Chilili. From this mountain village the company continued eastward to Antelope Springs,
through the red and white sandstone depths of Canon Piedra
Pintada, to Agua Negra and a point just below the James Giddings
and Preston Beck ranch. Here, near the junction with the Pecos,
their guide led them out of the canyon and up to the high prairie
and the familiar trail tracing the river's east bank. Carleton, it
would appear from Davidson's journal, each day covered nearly
twice the distance traveled by his men, tirelessly exploring in all
directions in his search and testing constantly the qualities of soil,
grass and water-but above all looking for that which was most
scarce-wood. The nearest supply of any amount worth mention
lay eighteen to twenty miles northeast of Bosque Redondo, in the
vicinity of Mesa de las Truchas.
At a point nearly midway in the bosque, and in the bottom lands
of the river's east bank, Carleton on October I 9 planted a stout
cottonwood post to mark the site he chose for a military post. 5
Arriving at Tecolote October 27 and regarding his survey concluded, Carleton unreservedly recommended his choice of site to
General Garland. 6 The valley of the bosque, by measurement,
averaged a mile and a quarter in breadth, but in every other respect seemed larger or better than he found it two years before.
Bosque Redondo alone contained sixteen thousand acres of arable
land, but with protection afforded by a post, settlers of the valley
would cultivate twice that acreage. He found the climate warmideal, in fact, for winter grazing of sheep. Citizens would Hock to
the valley, and in this happy event General Garland "would be a
public benefactor to an enviable degree." The fuel supply was
abundant, but should that of the bosque ever be exhausted wood
could be cut and Roated down river from the canyons above. Grazing and soil conditions of the valley were so excellent that a post
here could be almost self-sustaining; it should, in any case, be the
focal point for the year-around grazing and fattening of the depart-
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ment's beef cattle and mules and horses. The post, Carleton advised, should be built of adobes. Cottonwood beams cut on the spot
would serve as roof timbers-though in the end it might be better
to haul in pine vigas from the upper country. Considering its role
in defense against powerful tribes of Indians, Carleton proposed a
garrison of four companies: two of dragoons and two of infantry,
or three of dragoons and one of infantry or artillery.
More pressing affairs turned General Garland's attention elsewhere. Once again plans for a fort on the Pecos were shelved. Nothing further was heard of the proposal until the spring of 1857 when
a patrol of Mounted Rifles out of Fort Stanton passed through
Bosque Redondo on its way to Anton Chico. First Lieutenant
Hyatt C. Ransom mapped the route taken by the command and
later reported on the groves of cottonwoods that lined the Pecos
for twelve miles on its course through the bosque. Unaware, most
likely, of Carleton's earlier involvement, Ransom found this "would
be a fine spot for a Cavalry Command, the whole Country is
covered with splendid grass; and an abundance of Hay could be
cut on the ground, plenty of Roots of the Mesquit to mix with
the Cottonwood for Fuel." 7
Again, two years passed. In May 1859 Colonel B. L. E. Bonneville, now department commander, ordered Captain Thomas Claiborne with a detachment of Mounted Rifles to proceed eastward
from Fort Stanton to find a pass through the Sierra Capitan to the
Pecos, examine Bosque Redondo ("it having been recommended
as a site for a Military post"), and continue on a scout to the Canadian and the Conchas. From Hatch's ranch on the Gallinas, Captain Claiborne reported brieRy that "the water of the Pecos is
exceedingly bad and unhealthy," a judgment he would elaborate
upon later. 8 After his return to Fort Stanton Captain Claiborne
took an even more negative view. The Bosque Grande he found
grand in name only-"it is a poor affair." As for Bosque Redondo,
he described it as "an elbow of the river . . . cottonwoods are
mostly on the left [east] bank . . . extending for perhaps six or
seven miles, in clusters." The Pecos he found very crooked, but
the bosque itself "in that desert country is very agreeable. The
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lower half of the valley is tillable, the upper is filled with deep
sand. . . . The water of the river is bad and the surrounding
country is most desolate. The place is altogether unfit for a post." 9
Even had Captain Claiborne taken a favorable view of the Bosque Redondo and waters of the Pecos, it is doubtful if Colonel
Bonneville could, or would, have authorized the construction of a
post there. Sectional strife in the East and the strains of an onrushing Civil War no doubt contributed to other causes of immediacy that relegated a post on the Pecos to oblivion. Its only
advocate was far from the scene. In September I 856, Major Carleton had received orders removing him from New Mexico and directing him to proceed to Europe. The War Department found
him most qualified to study and report upon the methods and tactics of European cavalry, with especial concentration upon the
Cossacks of the Czar of Russia. 10 He returned to New Mexico in
I857, but in the summer following was ordered to report for duty
in California. There he remained until, in I 862, he led the California Column of three thousand volunteers across the Gila desert
to the Mesilla Valley of New Mexico. He came back at the very
peak of his military abilities, at the peak of his unbounded energy,
ambition, and self confidence. As a brevet brigadier of volunteers
(but major, still, of the Army's Sixth Cavalry), Carleton on September I 8 succeeded Colonel Edward Richard Sprigg Canby as
commander of the Military Department of New Mexico.
If General Carleton regretted that he had not been assigned to
the eastern war front where brigadiers were suddenly as common
as hens in a bam yard, there is no hint of it in his correspondence
or his actions. In New Mexico there was but one rooster. Almost
at once things began to happen.
One may imagine that the chronology of ensuing events does
not necessarily reflect what may have had priority in Carleton's
mind. In any case, he moved first and on October 8 by ordering
Colonel Kit Carson of the First New Mexico Mounted Volunteers
to proceed from Fort Union to Fort Stanton without delay and
"attack the Mescaleros and Navajos wherever you find them." 11 It
was an order soon modified to exclude, for the time being, the
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Navajo; their tum would come later. And on the last day of October, Carleton resurrected a plan long dead and forgotten. With
power now to command where before he could only recommend,
Carlton vindicated his judgment in the past. His orders were in
language reminiscent of eight and ten years before:
A Military Post will, at once, be established at the Bosque Redondo, on the Pecos River, and will be garrisoned by two companies
of Cavalry and one of Infantry.
While it will afford protection to people who, this winter may be
anxious to open farms along the rich valley of the Pecos, this post
will offer like protection to those who wish to move their Hocks and
herds on to the extensive grazing lands that lie between Anton Chico
and that point: a distance along the river of some ninety miles. At the
same time it does this, it will be a barrier to the incursions of the
Kioways, and Comanche Indians, and will intercept the northern
raids of the Mescalero Apaches. 12

The post would be nap1ed Fort Sumner, in honor of "that
staunch patriot, and veteran soldier." Troops would be sheltered
through the winter in tents or huts, but plans would be drawn by
the chief quartermaster for permanent buildings. These would be
started without delay as soon as spring weather permitted the making of adobes.
A board of officers was appointed four days later with instructions to meet at Bosque Redondo November I 5, or as soon afterward as possible, for the purpose of selecting the exact site. An
inability of two of the officers to serve, however, caused Carleton
to appoint a second board on November 14, the board including
Surgeon James M. McNulty, First Infantry, California Volunteers; and Captain Joseph Updegraff and First Lieutenant Allan S.
Anderson, both of the U.S. Fifth lnfantry. 13
Shortly after his appointment to the board of officers, Captain
Updegraff was notified that Carleton had selected him to be Fort
Sumner's first commander and thus in a dual capacity he would
proceed to Bosque Redondo and be prepared to remain indefinitely.
Four Pueblo Indians would be attached to his garrison as messen-

110

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW XLV: 2 1970

gers to carry expresses from the new post to Fort Union. Upd~
graff was instructed to establish communications with the commander of Camp Easton, located northeasterly of the bosque on
the Canadian River, a short distance from the future site of Fort
Bascom. 14 From Fort Stanton, meanwhile, Kit Carson gave tangible evidence that his campaign against the Mescalero was progressing well. To avoid further bloodshed, about one hundred
Apache had come in and encamped near the fort. Three of their
chiefs-Cadete, Chatto, and Estrella-were being brought to Santa
Fe by Apache Agent Lorenzo Labadi to talk peace with the department commander. 15
The arrival of the delegation gave a totally unforeseen and fortuitous turn to Fort Sumner's future, even before a site for the post
had been chosen. Meeting with the Mescalero on November 24,
General Carleton advised them that if they wished to avoid collision with Carson's troops it would be necessary for them to withdraw completely from Mescalero country and go either to Fort
Union or a new fort soon to be established at Bosque Redondo.
After some deliberation, Cadete and the others said they would
prefer to go to Fort Sumner. 16 Advising Carson of this development,
Carleton instructed him to send on to the bosque those Apache
who had come in. Transportation for women and children would
be provided in wagons of a supply train that was to leave Fort
Union for Stanton in a few days. Upon reaching Bosque Redondo
the Apache would be fed and given protection by Captain Updegraff.
Carson was to continue carrying the war to the rest of the tribe,
but so soon as others might surrender they also were to be sent to
Fort Sumner. "The result of this will be," Carleton explained,
"that eventually we shall have the whole tribe at Bosque Redondo
and then we can conclude a definite treaty with them and let them
all return again to inhabit their proper country." 17 The temporary
nature of this arrangement was emphasized by Superintendent of
Indian Affairs James L. Collins when he reminded Agent Labadi
that it was not intended to locate the Indians indefinitely at the
bosque, but to separate them "for the present from the [hostile]
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portion of the band. . . . As soon as the campaign is ended they
can again return to the neighborhood of Stanton where we hope
to be able to make provision for settling them permanently." 18
Thus Carleton's dream of settlers Rocking to the valley of the
Pecos would not materialize as soon as he had hoped, but his vision
of a military post at the bosque was realized when Captain U pdegraff pitched his tents on the river bank and officially established
Fort Sumner on Sunday, November 30. The first garrison was composed of troops of Company A, U.S. Fifth Infantry. Any glow of
satisfaction this occasioned no doubt was turned momentarily to
disbelief and anger when Carleton received the findings of his
board of officers. They had, indeed, faithfully carried out his orders
to select a site at Bosque Redondo: a point on the east bank of the
Pecos about 7}-2 miles southeast of the head of the bosque.
But there were certain unfortunate disadvantages. It was found
that Bosque Redondo was remote from the depot of supplies and
neighborhoods that would supply forage. Building materials would
have to be brought in from a great distance. And worse, the Pecos
contained "much unhealthy mat[t]er," and a large part of the surrounding valley was in danger of inundation by spring Roods.
Respectfully, therefore, the majority of the board recommended
that Fort Sumner be located at the junction of the Agua Negra
and the Pecos. Here there was a supply of good lumber for building, while firewood was conveniently at hand. The water was pure
and abundant and the grazing much finer than at the bosque. The
valley was not subject to Hooding, building stone was plentiful,
and the site was fifty miles nearer to the settlements and Fort
Union's supplies. The majority of the board for these reasons
found the valley of the Agua Negra "as a post of observation on
the country to the East . . . preferable to the Bosque Redondo." 19
The dissident majority are not named, but in consideration of his
future command it is unlikely that Captain Updegraff was one of
them.
The adverse report struck a response that in a peculiar way determined the future of Fort Sumner. General Carleton reacted as
though Bosque Redondo in some obscure but real sense was his
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own-to do with as he willed. Regardless of opposition from whatever level, from Santa Fe to the White House, Fort Sumner would
be as he chose to make it. He would explain his intentions to the
territorial legislature, to the governor of New Mexico, and to the
War Department. But he would not ask approval of anyone: this
he would take for granted.

A decisive tum of events occurred at the close of the Apache
campaign. Carleton suddenly changed his plans for the Mescalero,
some four hundred of whom were now held at the bosque. Instead
of letting them go home he would keep them there permanently"to have them, in short, become what is called in this country a
puehlo." 20 If they remained quiet they would be well cared for and
fed. If they attempted to leave they would be shot.
Approach of spring turned Carleton's attention to the Navajo,
whose raids were mounting in intensity. In April he traveled to
Fort Wingate, a post he had established in the preceding October
at Ojo del Gallo on the Navajo frontier. Lieutenant Colonel J.
Francisco Chaves, Wingate's commander, was hard pressed to
answer the general's barrage of questions. During his tour of service against the Navajo in 186o-I 861, Colonel Canby was known
to have favored a reservation for Navajo on the Little Colorado.
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Carleton was thirsty for information: what could Chaves tell him
about that country? Was Canby right? Chaves was intimately
acquainted with the country. Apprised that the general was about
to make war upon the Navajo, Chaves answered as best he couldat the end noticing that Carleton "was not entirely satisfied about
the location that would be most suitable for the Indians." 21 His
uncertainty did not last long. At Cubero, on his return, Carleton
met with the headmen Barboncito and Delgadito. He informed
them that all Navajo who wished to be friends of the Bilagaana
must move to Bosque Redondo under protection of the government; those who refused would be killed. Barboncito said he could
not go so far from his country, but would bring his family from
Canyon de Chelly to the vicinity of Fort Wingate; he would not
fight even if attacked. The troops might kill him but he would
not run. 22
Before Carleton launched the Navajo campaign June 15, another development occurred that had important bearing on Fort
Sumner's changing role. In May Superintendent Collins was
called upon to resign. The Indian Office appointed in his place Dr.
Michael Steck, who had served as agent for Apache since 1 8p.
Superintendent Steck and General Carleton fell to quarreling over
Indian policy almost at once. Relations between them came near
the point of open enmity in September when the first contingent
of Navajo-fifty-one men, women, and children of the Dine Ana'aii
band once controlled by Sandoval-voluntarily surrendered and
were sent to Bosque Redondo. Although Carleton had promised
them food and protection, Steck advised Agent Labadi, then at
the bosque, that these and other Navajo brought to the Pecos were
military prisoners of war, thus no concern to the Indian Department. Labadi must not take responsibility for them. 23 Carleton at
about the same time informed the War Department that he was
moving captured Navajo to Bosque Redondo. He did not ask approval but did propose that "If the government will only set apart
a reservation of forty miles square, with Fort Sumner . . . in the
centre, all the good land will be covered, ·and keep the settlers a
proper distance from the lndians." 24
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Steck supported Carleton's Navajo war but was convinced there
was not land enough at the bosque for both Apache and Navajo.
After inspecting the facilities at Fort Sumner, Steck in late October
departed for Washington, determined to thwart Carleton and
secure approval of his own plans. After his arrival he began haunting the office of Indian Commissioner William P. Dole. For more
than a month he hammered away on one theme: Carleton was
right in advocating a reservation at Bosque Redondo, but vvrong in
bringing Navajo there to encroach on land already occupied by
Apache. He urged the creation of a reservation forty miles square
(Carleton's idea), but recommended that it be restricted to three
thousand Jicarilla, Mescalero, and Mimbres Apache. The Navajo,
who numbered at least ten thousand souls, were far too numerous
to be sustained, with the Apache, on the bosque's six thousand
(not sixteen thousand) arable acres of land; Navajo should be
confined to a reservation in their own country. 25
Commissioner Dole finally was persuaded. He outlined Steck's
proposals in a communication to Secretary of the Interior John P.
Usher, asking that if the Secretary should concur, he then submit
the matter to President Lincoln. 26 Usher responded two days later.
He had called upon Mr. Lincoln January I 5, he said, and given
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the President Commissioner Dole's letter "suggesting the necessity
of having a reservation forty miles square, set apart for the Apache
Indians. . . . The President approved the recommendation, and
you are instructed to take such action . . . as may be necessary to
carry the order into effect." 27 Approval, in this case, could not have
been simpler. The President placed Dole's letter on his desk and
wrote on the cover: "Approved January 15, 1864. A. Lincoln."
A month later, lingering still in Washington, Steck informed
Carleton of certain changes affecting Bosque Redondo. "With reference to the Navajoes [he wrote] I would state that they will remain entirely under the controll of the Genl. commanding until
such time as the tribe can be restored to the Department of the
Interior. . . . " A bill before Congress provided for treaties with
"wild tribes" of Indians. Should it pass, Steck was confident that
provision soon would be made to remove Navajo from Bosque
Redondo and confine them in their own country; he would agree
witp Canby that "the Colorado Chiquita is the proper place for the
permanent location of the Navajo Tribe." 28
President Lincoln was preoccupied with the grim course of the
Civil War in an election year. His attention was fixed elsewhere
when Carleton appealed to the War Department for aid in maintaining 4,106 Navajo at Fort Sumner. More would be coming,
more than twice that number. Upon the recommendation of Secretary of War Stanton, Secretary Usher proposed that Congress appropriate $10o,ooo to subsist the Navajo "upon a reservation at
the 'Bosque Redondo,' on the Pecos river." 29 It was the first appropriation of many that were voted.
Steck was out-maneuvered. Carleton through sheer determination-or was it obstinacy?-would have his way.
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NOTES

x. A. B. Bender, "Government Explorations in the Territory of New
Mexico, 1846-1859,'' NMHR, vol. 9 (1934), pp. 12-14.
2. Maj. Thomas Swords to Maj. Gen. Thomas S. Jesup, Oct. 25, 1851.
Senate Exec. Docs., 32 Cong., I sess., No. I, Pt. I, p. 236. Major Swords
separated from Sumner's command of some 500 recruits July 10 on the
Rayado, and Sumner arrived in Santa Fe July I9· In the time elapsed Sumner could scarcely have gone below Anton Chico.
3· Carleton to Sumner, Fort Union, Feb. 25, I852. National Archives,
Records of Army Commands, Record Group 98 (hereinafter, NA, RAC,
RG 98), Letters Received, No. I6. Like Judd, Carleton returned by his
outward route, reaching Fort Union (after drunken mutiny in his command at Las Vegas) February 24.
4- Journal of an Expedition to the Bosque Redondo commencing at
Albuquerque N.M. Oct sth z854, by Henry B. Davidson, Brvt. 2d Lieut.
2d Dragoons. NA, RG 393, Records of the U.S. Army Continental Commands, I82I-I920, Dept. of New Mexico, Unregistered Letters Received,
1854·
5· "It is IO miles 908 yards from the bluffs at the lower end of the
wide valley," Davidson observed, "& 8 miles 955 yards from the Caretas
Canon at the head of the valley." The site was 90 miles below Anton Chico.
6. Carleton to Bvt. Maj. W. A. Nichols, A.AG., Santa Fe, Tecolote,
Oct. 28, I854· NA, RAC, RG 98, No. C-74-I854, LR.
7· Ransom to Maj. J. H. Holmes, commanding Fort Stanton, June 26,
I857· NA, RAC, RG 98, No. H-2o-I857, LR. The patrol mentioned here
was commanded by Capt. Andrew J. Lindsay and was in the field from
late May into early June.
8. Claiborne to Lt. John D. Wilkins, A.A.G., Santa Fe, July 4, I859·
NA, RAC, RG 98, No. C-I5-I859, LR.
9· Claiborne to Wilkins, Aug. 9, I859· NA, RAC, RG 98, No. C-2Iz859, LR. An analysis made of a sample of water I took from the Pecos at
Fort Sumner in May 1965 showed a saline content of 573 parts per million. James McCarthy of the consulting firm of Tighe & Bond, of Holyoke,
Massachusetts, explained that 250 PPM sulphates and 250 PPM chlorides
was near the maximum water standard limit approved by the U.S. Public
Health Service. He emphasized that obviously many factors could change
the chemical content of Pecos water, both season-to-season and over a
period of I oo years.
IO. Aurora Hunt, Major General James Henry Carleton, z814-1873,
Western Frontier Dragoon (Glendale, I958).
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1 1. Carleton to Carson, Oct. 8, I 862. NA, RAC, RG 98, Old Book
Io, bound as 13, Dept. of New Mexico.
12. General Orders No. 94, Oct. 3I, I862. HQ, Dept. of New Mexico, Santa Fe. NA, RAC, RG 9413. Special Orders No. I98, Nov. 14, I862. HQ, Dept. of New Mexico, Santa Fe. NA, No. 356, Orders and Special Orders, Dept. of New
Mexico, 1862.
"'
14. Capt. John C. McFerran, A.Q.M., to Updegraff, Nov. I8, 1862.
NA, RAC, RG 98, LS.
15. Carson to Capt. Ben C. Cutler, Nov. 12, 1862. NA, RAC, RG
98, No. C-5I8-I862, LR.
I6. Santa Fe Weekly Gazette, Nov. 29, I862.
17. Carleton to Carson, Nov. 25, I862. NA, RAC, RG 98, LS.
18. Collins to Labadi, Santa Fe, Nov. 26, I862. NA, RAC, RG 98,
No. 22/62, LR. The letter officially confirmed what Labadi knew already.
He and Collins, as well as Acting Governor W. F. M. Amy were present
when Carleton talked with the Apache November 24.
19. McNulty, Updegraff, and Anderson, to Cutler, Fort Sumner, Dec.
4, 1862. NA, RAC, RG 98, No. M-287-1862, LR.
20. Carleton to Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas, March I9, 1863.
"Condition of the Indian Tribes. . . ." Senate Reports, 2d sess., 39 Cong.,
I 866-67, P· 106.
21. Chaves to Collins, May 4, r863. NA, Letters Received by the
Office of Indian Affairs, New Mexico Superintendency, 1849-80, Microcopy 234, Roll 55 I (hereinafter cited as NMS 234-55I).
22. Ibid.
23. Steck to Labadi, Sept. 5, r863. NA, Records of the New Mexico
Superintendency of Indian Affairs, I849-6o, Microcopy T2I, Roll 5 (hereinafter cited as NMS T21-5).
24. Carleton to Thomas, Sept. 6, r863. NA, NMS T2I-5.
25. Steck to Dole, Dec. Io and 23, r863. NA, NMS T2I-5 and NMS
234-551; Carleton to Thomas, Jan. I2, 1864, "Condition of the Indian
Tribes ... ," p. I 55·
26. Dole to Usher, Jan. 14, 1864, "Executive Orders Relating to Indian Reserves," Washington: Government Printing Office, 1902, p. 73·
27. Usher to Dole, Jan. r6, 1864, enclosure with Dole to Steck, Jan.
I8, I864. NA, NMS T2I-6.
28. Steck to Carleton, Feb. 12, I864, and Steck to Dole, Feb. I6, 1864.
NA, NMS T2I-6.
29. March 31, 1864: House of Representatives, 38 Cong., I sess.,
Exec. Doc. 65: "Appropriations for the Navajo Indians." NA, RAC, No.
57I-W-I6r-I864-

,

...

.

....~~

~.,AI•.

~. .... -·~._ ........ ....,..

..........

.,.

\

"

l

"::--

.....

c"'•

~.

{)
'
( I

0

-

...-::.
........

\)

./

"""- ... ~ .

<)

c

'"\

l

I

(

("".,!,..,.,..oii.,Jt#lloA ~I'
•.1'

(,,···~~ ':t.ll V 'III

a

1 ~ LII H)

(
(

(

¥

& .. 1.
.JIII;J.,.
oee~~~~~~------~N~~~~-=~~~~~~

.

or A
Jl'hfl

MILITARY RECONNAISSANCE

NAMES

l"m•JJfj

or CAMPS.

,A., r;.- L.,
I

I

iff: ____ lin""" k'o,,/ "" c·u(u ,,..,,, "'"(to
, _____ J.' ..J~; 'J • .-

1

Off~'--

_.
•
~ 7}Cifi}I.J I
1.
1.<it- tlr.J,;.._,_, JJ. .. Jl ..;J.J..~ l '»'f; l...!J.JIUI rln•M.ll

BVT.CAPT. HENR\' B.JUDD THIRD ARTY

:r.tr Jkl,l;rl• ,.,,.; l'.....J.r ---~·-"''1'1'""

lfiJ i'lu•••,P!' f h'r .n'lor,;-\Vllolll!3'i'l.,
;:;..ur.... H. # •.• h-'•J•Iuri\~"'""1'~ ,I1'x .7Nf3,m;nlln P..\"~J

~t.tiJ._O , . , fleu (ls •
.f.....J,f,hL"t(•CIWIUIII.

'l

1,, •/fflplm f"J ?r ~ ...,:.,H1 J AI >-- I l

JJu Ndff I UJJ] ( f rfdiiJ,, rt,..l!""~'* ~-r -j JI.. ,.AJ- M "",'HI JJ,h••
••·•-r AU.J. ~T !J f J/tJYITJJ,.IJJt l<:.Jf£ . 1\JIIo"ll .. 1\ fln•rraJorJ <

]}' D»»n.•

lJ.c

SVT.COL.JOHN MUNROE.
fOnl/llaJUlitlf{ 9rJ, IIi/Oqvl

Sm•»"u J.IJMaJJ liy R,-,... .HAl'-"»
iJANTII

rt

lll!D

- : MWIMI

2
J
f

r~~

• ,..J!r/,,,. ,,,..;. ~ ll'~~t"'"'

'

Ill M.

' • J"
o'

·I

o

~~(~.
.J,.Jro l'<ltf<

.

Ku r/1../•J do:Utne~

I--..J"JI ••••

.J. ,(J l.u t'..... {.,
JIJ . :;J. . ..

IJ;; .A,.. I.,. l'A., •.
, R,', a.lc,

J3

a. ~e!n.a.·

IT J,
II 6f

' J.,._ .J./i,..

I

AI H

\11...1...

1JI!))j\

•J,..,.. . . .~.. r.,,.;.,. l.t.f4/
. Jr. , J4>N,J..IJ

,

,,.~f .•,,,'\:n,u. .) -')' ¥tr

jy,.,, 1mr u

